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COMMENT
THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR
LAW IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
The rights of private employees in Missouri, as well as in all other states,
are protected by the National Labor Relations Act.' Private employees have,
among other rights, the right to join unions, 2 the right to strike, 3 the right
to bargain collectively,4 and the right to sue to enforce collective bargaining
agreements. 5 Public employees, however, are not covered by the National
Labor Relations Act. 6 Other than constitutional protection, public employees
have only such rights as may be granted by statute. 7 Missouri has enacted
the Public Sector Labor Law8 which covers public employees in Missouri.
Under the Missouri statute and case law, public employees do have the right
to join a union. 9 However, public employees in Missouri have no right to
strike,'0 no right to bargain collectively as that term is understood in the
1. 29 U.S.C. 151-169 (1982).
2. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
3. National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 7; 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
5. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
6. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (1982).
Section 2(2) states: "The term 'employer'. . . shall not include the United States or
any State or political subdivision thereof .... ." Section 2(3) states: "The term 'em-
ployee' . . . shall not include . .. any individual employed by . . . any person who
is not an employer as herein defined." Id.
7. In addition, the federal government has statutes apart from the National
Labor Relations Act which cover federal employees. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, § 701, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7107-7135 (1982).
8. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1978).
9. E.g., City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1245, 206 S.W.2d 539,
542 (1947) (en banc).
10. E.g., St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 544 S.W.2d 573, 575
(Mo. 1976) (en banc); see also Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.530 (1978).
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private sector," and no right to enforce any agreement which they reach with
a public employer.' 2 What is the difference between public employees and
private employees in Missouri? Why should they be treated differently? The
answer, according to Missouri court decisions, is that the private employer
was established to make a profit for its owners while "the public employer
was established by and is run for the benefit of all the people and its authority
derives not from contract nor the profit motive inherent in the principle of
free private enterprise, but from the constitution, statutes, civil service rules,
regulations and resolutions . . .. "3 For this reason, then, according to the
courts, public employment labor relations law in Missouri differs from the
law of private employment under the National Labor Relations Act.
II. Ti RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
A. , Constitutionally Protected Rights of Public Employees
The Mis~ouri Supreme Court set the parameters of public employee
bargaining rights in 1947 in City of Springfield v. Clouse.14 The court in
Clouse acknowledged that the right of public employees to organize into
labor organizations, subject to some regulation for the public welfare, 5 is
insured by the federal and state constitutional guarantees of the right to
speak freely, to peaceably assemble, and to petition public bodies.' 6 The
court, however, went on to hold that the guarantee in the Missouri consti-
tution "that employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing"'17 was inapplicable
to public employees. 8
11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo.
1969).
12. E.g., Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc).
13. Curators of Univ. v. Public Serv. Employees Local No. 45, 520 S.W.2d
54, 58 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4321(a)(4)); see also
Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 366 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) ("authority of a public body
derives only from the consent of the people") (emphasis in original); City of Grand-
view v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
14. 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947) (en banc). This case was a
"declaratory judgment action seeking determination of the legal power of the City
to make collective bargaining contracts, with labor unions representing city employees,
concerning wages, hours, collection of union dues, and working conditions." Id. at
1245, 206 S.W.2d at 541.
15. Id. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
16. Id.
17. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 29.
18. 356 Mo. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
[Vol. 51
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This holding, that public employees cannot bargain collectively with their
employer, was grounded on two major rationales. The first rationale was
based on the non-delegation doctrine. The court stated that
a whole matter of... working conditions for any public service, involves
the exercise of legislative powers .... [T]he legislature cannot [constitu-
tionally] delegate its legislative powers .... If such powers cannot be del-
egated, they surely cannot be bargained or contracted away; and certainly
not by any administrative or executive officers [who would be the ones
bargaining with the public employees if they had the right to bargain col-
lectively.] Thus... working conditions of public.., employees are wholly
matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract."9
Besides the non-delegation rationale, the court also made a sovereignty ar-
gument. 20 Because working conditions of public employees are matters to be
handled within the legislature's discretion, the court reasoned that public
employees have no right to bargain and contract with respect to their working
conditions because "no legislature can bind itself or its successor to make
or continue any legislative act. ' 21 In other words, public employees cannot
make a binding contract with their employer with respect to working con-
ditions even when the legislative body has approved the contract, because
the legislative body must be free to alter these working conditions at will. 2
Because of the non-delegation doctrine and the sovereignty of the legislature,
public employees cannot engage in collective bargaining, as that term is
understood in the private sector, i.e., negotiation between employer and
employees over conditions of employment for the purpose of reaching a
mutual agreement binding on both. At most, public employees can give
"expression to desires for the lawmaker's consideration and guidance.""
The court in Clouse did hold open one possible instance in which public
employees might have a right to bargain collectively with their employer in
the same manner as private employees. The court stated that the General
Assembly might be able to provide for the operation of the proprietary
functions of a public body distinctly and separately from its traditional gov-
ernmental functions. 24 In such circumstances, the court suggested that public
19. Id. at 1251, 206 S.W.2d at 545.
20. The designation of the two rationales used in Clouse for denying collective
bargaining rights to public employees as the non-delegation argument and the sov-
ereignty argument was adopted by Comment, Missouri Public Employment Agree-
ments: The Enforceability Issue, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 981 (1983).
21. Clouse, 356 Mo. at 1251, 206 S.W.2d at 545.
22. Id. at 1248, 206 S.W.2d at 543.
23. Id. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 545.
24. "A governmental duty is one which is performed for the common good
of all. A proprietary duty is one which is performed for the special benefit or profit
of the city as a corporate entity." Counts v. Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., 663 S.W.2d
357, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). In performing governmental functions "a city acts as
1986]
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employees engaged in the public body's proprietary function might be able
to bargain collectively with the public employer in a manner similar to bar-
gaining in private industry. 25
the agent of the state in the exercise of sovereign powers .... Proprietary functions
are acts performed in the pursuit of private or corporate duties for the particular
benefit of the corporation and its inhabitants." Nanna v. Village of McArthur, 44
Ohio App. 2d 22, 24-25, 335 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1974). The operation of police and
fire departments is generally accepted as a governmental function, while the operation
of public utilities by a city is generally accepted as a proprietary function.
25. , Clouse, 356 Mo. at 1252, 206 S.W.2d at 546. The Missouri Supreme Court
came close to confirming this exception two years after Clouse in State ex rel. Moore
v. Julian, 222 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1949) (en banc). The bus system of the city of
Springfield was municipally owned and operated by board of public utilities of that
city. The board of public utilities and the union representing bus drivers and bus
support personnel were unable to reach an agreement on working conditions. The
union sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the State Board of Mediation, a state
agency created by the King-Thompson Act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 295.010-.210 (1978),
to regulate public utility labor disputes. The State Board of Mediation refused to
accept jurisdiction. 222 S.W.2d at 720-21. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the
1945 Board of Public Utilities Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 91.330-.430 (1969) (repealed
1975), which empowered any city of the second class to establish a Board of Public
Utilities to operate city-owned utilities, separated proprietary functions from govern-
mental functions in cities of the second class. This separation of functions "remov[ed]
any impediment to the handling of employer-employee relations in municipally op-
erated utilities on the same basis as in private industry ... at least in cities of the
second class," and thus the King-Thompson Act was held to be applicable to the
Springfield labor dispute. The court ordered the State Board of Mediation to accept
jurisdiction of the dispute. 222 S.W.2d at 725-26.
In Gildewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1958) (en banc), unions repre-
senting employees of city-owned public utilities in Springfield sought a declaration
that the unions had a right to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the
Board of Public Utilities. At this time Springfield was no longer a city of the second
class because, subsequent to Julian, Springfield had adopted a city charter. Id. at
750-51. Unlike the 1945 Board of Public Utilities Act, which applied only to cities
of the second class, Springfield's charter did not provide for the separation of the
city's public utilities from its general governmental functions. Therefore, the court
held that the general rule of Clouse controlled and that the public utilities employees
had no right to bargain collectively with the Board of Public Utilities. Id. at 755-56.
While the court did not retreat from the proprietary-governmental dichotomy of
Clouse and Julian, it did state that the decision in Julian was not that the 1945 Board
of Public Utilities Act authorized collective bargaining by public employees, but only'
that the combination of that act and the King-Thompson Act gave the State Board
of Mediation jurisdiction over labor disputes in city-owned public utilities. Id. at 753.
No other public employee bargaining cases in Missouri have turned on the
proprietary-governmental dichotomy. However, in State ex rel. Board of Pub. Util.
v. Crow, 592 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), in which the issue was whether the
Open Meetings Act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 610.010-.030 (1978), requires that discussion
sessions between public employees and their employers over working conditions be
open to the public, the court held that the distinction between proprietary and gov-
[Vol. 51
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In a companion case to Clouse, Kind v. Priest,26 the Missouri Supreme
Court elaborated on what it had meant when it recognized that public em-
ployees have the right to join labor organizations subject to some regulation
for the public welfare. In King, police officers challenged a city rule pro-
hibiting police officers from joining a union as being unconstitutional because
it denied them the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed
under the federal and state constitutions.2 7 The court upheld the rule on the
ground that it was a reasonable rule designed to protect the public from
"friction and dissention within the force" and from "prejudice and favor-
itism in the enforcement of the laws" that could potentially result from
allowing police officers to organize into unions. 21
Police officers again challenged, on the same grounds as in King, a city
rule prohibiting them from joining unions in Vorbeck v. McNeal.29 The three-
judge federal court recognized that allowing police to organize into a union
"raises the specter of a strike against the public interest." 3 0 However, this
rule was found to "sweep unnecessarily broadly" and thus to exceed the
permissible bounds of the first and fourteenth amendments. 31 The court stated
that "[t]he appropriate method for protecting the state's legitimate interest
in averting such a strike is not to restrict freedom of association, but rather
to fashion precise legislation declaring such strikes illegal.' '32 In view of
Vorbeck's rejection of the King reasoning, it appears that a public employee's
constitutional right to join a union can never be denied as a regulation to
ernmental functions was irrelevant to the issue. Id. at 288.
The proprietary governmental dichotomy has been criticized in the years since
the Julian and Glidewell decisions. One commentator has stated that it is "nearly
impossible to draw any meaningful line between the proprietary and governmental
functions." Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MIcH.
L. REv. 885, 890 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has called the proprietary-
governmental dichotomy a "quagmire" and "a rule of law that is inherently un-
sound." Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (case decided
under the Federal Tort Claims Act). However, Missouri courts still accept the pro-
prietary-governmental dichotomy in determining tort liability of municipal corpora-
tions. See, e.g., Counts v. Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 357, 362-63 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) ("A city may be held liable for torts arising out of the performance
of proprietary functions but no recovery is allowed for torts arising out of the per-
formance of governmental functions.").
26. 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1947) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 333
U.S. 852, reh'g denied, 333 U.S. 878 (1948).
27. Id. at 80, 206 S.W.2d at 556.
28. Id. at 80-85, 206 S.W.2d at 556-57.
29. 407 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo.) (three-judge court), aff'd without opinion,
426 U.S. 943 (1976).
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protect the public welfare because the public welfare can always be protected
by more precisely fashioned legislation.
B. Statutory Rights of Public Employees.
The General Assembly enacted Missouri's first public employee bar-
gaining statute in 1965.11 The act provided that public employees, other than
police, deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, members of the national guard,
and teachers,3 4 had the right to form and join labor organizations and to
present proposals to their employers relative to conditions of employment.35
No such employee was to be discriminated against because of the exercise of
these rights or coerced into joining or not joining a labor organization. 6
Public bodies were authorized, but not required, to negotiate with labor
organizations relative to conditions of employment of the public body's em-
ployees.37 The results of the negotiation were to be reduced to writing and
presented to the governing body38 for appropriate action. 9 It has been sug-
33. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (Supp. 1965) (amended 1978).
34. For a discussion of the justification for these exceptions, see Loevi, The
Development and Current Application of Missouri Public Sector Labor Law, 36 Mo.
L. Rev. 167, 174 (1971).
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.510 (Supp. 1965).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 105.520; 23 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68 (May 6, 1966). A controversy
arose over whether the word "negotiations" meant collective bargaining. Loevi, supra
note 34, at 175. If the term did rnean collective bargaining, it appeared that this
section violated the Missouri Constitution as interpreted in Clouse. The Missouri
Attorney General, however, soon concluded that "negotiations" did not mean col-
lective bargaining. See 23 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68 (May 6, 1966). The word merely
meant that representatives of the public employees and of the public employer could
"meet ... and talk about problems of mutual interest." Id.
38. There may be some confusion over the terms "public employer" (or
"public body") and "governing body." They are not necessarily the same entity,
although they are closely related. The governing body is the legislative authority for
the particular governmental subdivision in which the public employees work. Ex-
amples are the city council of a city and the board of education of a school district.
The public employer is usually a particular governmental agency, board, commission,
department, etc., within a governmental subdivision. Examples are the police de-
partments, fire departments, and public works departments. For a discussion of the
occasional difficulty in determining who the public employer is, see Locke, A Missouri
Plan for Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 62 (1979). Under
the procedures of the current public employee labor law the public employer would
probably meet, confer, and discuss proposals with the bargaining representative of
its employees. Then any results of the discussions would be written down and passed
on to the governing body for adoption, modification, or rejection. In some cases the
governing body negotiates directly with the public employees. Probably the most
common example of this is teachers negotiating with the board of education or its
representatives.
39. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520 (Supp. 1965). The Missouri Attorney General
found that the results of the negotiations were not binding on the employer. 23 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 68 (May 4, 1966).
[Vol. 51
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gested that this act granted public employees no more rights than they already
possessed under Clouse.40
This act was replaced in 1967 by the Public Sector Labor Law (PSLL),41
which, with one amendment, 42 is Missouri's current statute governing public
employee bargaining. As in the 1965 act, this act provides that public em-
ployees, with the same exceptions, have the right to form and join labor
organizations and to present proposals to their employers relative to condi-
tions of employment, and that no such employee is to be discriminated
against because of exercising these rights or coerced into joining or not
joining a labor organization. 43 In a significant departure from the 1965 act,
this act provides that public bodies" or their designated representatives "shall
meet, confer and discuss 45 . . . proposals relative to ... conditions of em-
ployment ... with the labor organization which is the exclusive bargaining
representative 46 of [the public body's] employees in a unit appropriate" 47 if
such proposals are presented by the exclusive bargaining representative. 48
Thus, unlike the 1965 act which says the public body may deal with labor
organizations, the 1967 act requires that the public body at least meet and
talk with the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. The results
of these discussions are to be reduced to writing and presented to the ap-
propriate governing body for "adoption, modification or rejection. '49
The second significant change from the 1965 act gives the State Board
of Mediation" (hereinafter referred to as the Board) the authority to resolve
40. See Loevi, supra note 34, at 173.
41. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1978).
42. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
43. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.510 (1978).
44. Id. § 105.500(1) (public body defined as "the State of Missouri, or any
officer, agency, department, bureau, division, board or commission of the state, or
any other political subdivision of or within the state").
45. It is fairly clear that, given the Attorney General's interpretation of the
term "negotiations," 23 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68 (May 6, 1966), that term as used in
the 1965 act and the term "meet, confer and discuss" as used in the 1967 act mean
the same thing. Loevi, supra note 34, at 179.
46. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.500(2) (exclusive bargaining representative defined
as "an organization which has been designated or selected by majority of employees
in an appropriate unit as the representative of such employees in such unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining").
47. Id. § 105.500(1) (appropriate unit defined as "a unit of employees at any
plant or installation or in a craft or in a function of a public body which establishes
a clear and identifiable community of interest among the employees concerned").
48. See id. § 105.520.
49. Id.
50. The Board was established in 1947, Mo. REv. STAT. § 295.030 (1978), to
regulate public utility labor disputes. It consists of two members with ties to organized
labor, two members with ties to employers, and a chairman. The board's public utility
regulation functions were transferred to the Department of Labor and Industrial
Relations. Mo. REv. STAT. § 286.005.7 (Supp. 1984).
1986]
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the issues of appropriate bargaining units and majority representation. 5' Ju-
risdiction for appeal from Board decisions is vested in the circuit courts.5 2
The final provision of the 1967 act states, just as the final provision of the
1965 act had, that nothing in this act shall be construed as granting a right
to strike to employees covered by the act..3
In 1969, the PSLL was amended to provide that those employees who
were not given the right to join unions by the act-police, deputy sheriffs,
highway patrolmen, members of the national guard, and teachers-did have
the right to form benevolent, social, or fraternal associations. 54 The amend-
ment also provided that membership in these associations could not be re-
stricted because of race, creed, color, religion, or ancestry.5
The constitutionality of the PSLL was affirmed in 1969 by the Missouri
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool.5 6 In that case, the
city challenged the law's constitutionality on three grounds. Using Clouse,
the city argued that the PSLL, by granting public employees the right to
bargain collectively, unconstitutionally delegated away the legislative power
51. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 105.525 (1978).
52. Id.
53. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.530 (1978). Arguably this provision does not itself
make strikes by public employees illegal. An interpretation of the wording of this
provision is that while the right to strike has not been granted, neither has it been
enjoined. An attorney for a public employee union who claims responsibility for
drafting the wording has indicated that this was the intent of the clause. However,
given the attitude of Missouri legislators toward public employee bargaining at the
time of the PSLL's passage, the Missouri General Assembly probably did not have
a similar intention. See Loevi, supra note 34, at 176. In any event, Missouri courts
have held that public employee strikes are illegal at common law. See State ex rel.
Ashcioft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); City of Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
Missouri courts have also interpreted section 105.530 to mean that public employee
strikes are illegal. See St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 544 S.W.2d 573,
575 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State ex rel. O'Leary v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation,
509 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441
S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo. 1969); State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local
No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas
City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); City of Webster Groves v. Insti-
tutional and Pub. Employees Union, 524 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); City
of Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
54. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 105.510.
55. Id.
56. 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969). In this case, the city of Cabool had refused
to meet with the union representing its employees in the electrical, park and pool,
street and water and sewer departments. The city had also discharged, laid off, or
reduced the pay of a number of its employees because of their union activities. The
union, through its officers, and the employees it represented sought, inter alia, an
order requiring the city to deal with the union as provided by the PSLL and rein-




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss3/2
LABOR LA W
of the governing bodies which control the public employers with whom the
public employees bargained. In answer, the court stated that the law did not
give public employees the right to bargain collectively as that term is under-
stood in the private sector because the PSLL did not make it an unfair labor
practice for the governing body to refuse to adopt the agreement produced
by the bargaining and did not give public employees the right to strike. The
court held that the PSLL did not violate the Clouse decision because the
public employer is required only to meet, confer, and discuss; it need not
agree to any arrangement reached in the discussions. Also the legislative
discretion of the governing body is preserved because it may adopt, modify,
or reject outright the results of the discussions.17
The city's second argument was that the PSLL was unconstitutional
because it made arbitrary and unreasonable classifications in that it granted
rights to some public employees while excluding private employees and certain
public employees. The court responded by pointing out that private employees
already had the right to organize and bargain collectively. The court stated
that the exclusion of police, deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, and mem-
bers of the national guard was based upon an appropriate classification
because those performing police functions are sui generis. The exclusion of
teachers was said to be consistent with other provisions applicable only to
teachers and with other similar distinctions made in other states."s
Third, the city argued that the provision requiring the public employer
to meet, confer, and discuss with the bargaining representative of the em-
ployees was a violation of representative government because those with views
differing from the majority in the unit would be shut out of the process.
The court rejected this argument on the ground that the minority members
have a constitutionally protected right to present their differing views to the
public employer. 9
One part of the PSLL has been declared unconstitutional by the federal
courts. In Vorbeck v. McNeal,6° police officers challenged their exclusion
from the PSLL's general grant to public employees of the right to form
unions. They contended that the exclusion of police officers from the cov-
erage of the PSLL denied them their rights of free speech and assembly and
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id. at 43. Examples given by the court of statutes applicable only to
teachers were statutes providing special pension rights, Mo. REv. STAT., Chapter 169.
and certification procedures, Mo. Rv. STAT. Chapter 168. Id.
59. Id. After upholding the constitutionality of the PSLL, the Supreme Court
held that the employees discharged and demoted for union activities were entitled to
reinstatement and back pay and that the union was entitled to have the city enjoined
from discriminating against the union and its members and to recognition by the city
as the representative of its employees. Id. at 44-45.
60. 407 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo.) (three-judge court),-aff'd without opinion,
426 U.S. 943 (1976).
1986]
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to petition for redress of grievances, and created an unreasonable and ar-
bitrary classification between police officers and other employees, in violation
of the federal and state constitutions. 6' The court agreed, stating that the
exclusion of police officers from the PSLL's coverage swept unnecessarily
broad, thus exceeding the permissible bounds of the first and fourteenth
amendments. The court held that the PSLL was unconstitutional insofar as
it prohibited police officers from forming or joining labor organizations. 62
The court also held, however, that the exclusion of police officers from the
provisions of the PSLL which regulate bargaining procedures of public em-
ployees was constitutional because the unique role of police officers in society
makes the decision of bargaining procedure applicability to police officers
one properly reserved to the state legislature.63
On a different note, the question has been raised as to whether the PSLL
may be applied to constitutional charter cities. 64 The question arises because
article VI, section 22 of the Missouri Constitution states that "no law shall
be enacted creating or fixing the powers, duties, or compensation of any
municipal office or employment, for any city framing or adopting its own
charter under this or any previous Constitution." This provision is limited
by article VI, section 19 which states that "[a]ny city adopting a charter for
its own government can do so only as far as the charter is consistent with
the subject to the laws of the state." In interpreting these seemingly con-
flicting provisions, the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Burke v.
Cervantes,6 held that a state statute takes precedence over a city charter only
when the statute is intended to deal with a statewide concern, and is thus
beyond the scope of constitutional charter city power. 6 One commentator
thinks that as to the question of local versus statewide concern, "there would
seem to be little doubt that the overall conduct of public, employee labor
relations is as important to the state as state aid and welfare programs which
frequently specify minimum qualifications for local professional employees
to insure a reasonable level of competence." 67 Based largely on Cervantes,
this commentator concludes that Missouri courts are likely to find that con-
stitutional charter cities are subject to the PSLL.68
61. Id. at 735.
62. Id. at 739.
63. Id.; see also Beverlin v. Board of Police Comm'r, 722 F.2d 395, 396 (8th
Cir. 1983).
64. See Loevi, supra note 34, at 182-84.
65. 423 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1968).
66. Id. at 793-94; see also City of St. Louis v. Missouri Comm'n on Human
Rights, 517 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Mo. 1974) ("The state has the right in the exercise of
the police power to prescribe a policy of general state-wide application which applies
to [constitutional] charter cities.").
67. Loevi, supra note 34, at 183.
68. Id. at 184. Although the courts have decided cases involving constitutional
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C. Does the PSLL Grant Any Rights to Public Employees Which are not
Already Constitutionally Guaranteed?
The PSLL grants public employees, except police, deputy sheriffs, high-
way patrolmen, members of the national guard, and teachers, the right to
form and join labor organizations. 69 Public employees already had the right
to form and join labor organizations, subject to some regulation for the
public welfare, under Clouse.7 0 And though police officers could be denied
this right by their employer under King v. Priest as a regulation to protect
the public welfare, 71 the King reasoning was rejected in Vorbeck v. McNeal
where the court found that any denial to police officers of the right to form
or join labor organizations was unconstitutional. 72 Vorbeck appears to say
that the protection of the public welfare exception to the right of public
employees to form and join labor organizations, recognized under Clouse,
is no longer good law. No stronger argument that a particular group of
public employees should be denied the right to form or join labor organi-
zations as a regulation to protect the public welfare could be made than in
the case of police officers, and Vorbeck holds that police officers cannot be
denied this right. Therefore, it appears that all public employees have a
constitutionally protected right to form and join labor unions.
Since police officers have a constitutional right to form and join labor
organizations under Vorbeck, it is arguable that deputy sheriffs, highway
patrolmen, and members of the national guard also have such a constitutional
right because they also perform police functions. This is particularly true
because the public welfare exception to the general right of public employees
to form and join labor organizations seems to retain no vitality after Vorbeck.
Teachers have been specifically recognized as having a constitutional right
to form and join labor organizations. 73 Thus, the constitutional right of
public employees to form and join labor organizations is broader than the
PSLL's grant of the right to form and join labor organizations.
charter cities, the issue of whether the PSLL applies to constitutional charter cities
seems never to have been raised by the parties. One court, though, has recognized
that the issue exists when it assumed without deciding that the PSLL applied to
Kansas City, a constitutional charter city. German v. City of Kansas City, 577 S.W.2d
54, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
69. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.510.
70. See 356 Mo. at 1246-47, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
71. See King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 85-88, 206 S.W.2d 547, 555-57 (1947) (en
banc).
72. 407 F. Supp. at 739.
73. See Peters v. Board of Educ., 506 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Mo. 1974); Bergmann
v. Board of Educ., 360 Mo. 644, 654-55, 230 S.W.2d 714, 720 (1950). But see Willis
v. School Dist., 606 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (teachers are prohibited
from forming and joining labor organizations under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.510 (1978);
Peters and Bergmann not mentioned).
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The PSLL grants most public employees the right to present proposals
to their employer relative to working conditions through the representative
of their own choosing. 74 Clouse recognized that all public employees were
guaranteed this right under the federal and state constitutions. 75 Thus the
constitutional right of public employees in this area is broader than the rights
granted under the PSLL.
The PSLL requires public bodies or their representatives to meet, confer,
and discuss proposals relative to conditions of employment with the bar-
gaining representative of their employees. 76 At first this appears to be a
benefit granted to public employees by the statute which they did not already
enjoy under the constitution, particularly since the Missouri attorney general
had stated that "[iun the absence of any statutory provisions authorizing it
to do so, a county court [public employer] does not have the power and
cannot enter into negotiations with a labor union. ' 77 However, in 1969, in
State ex rel Missey v. City of Cabool, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted
Clouse as constitutionally requiring public employees to meet, confer, and
discuss proposals with labor organizations representing their employees.
78
Thus, the PSLL added nothing to the already existing constitutional
rights of public employees. What the PSLL does provide is a statutory vehicle
by which public employees may assert their constitutional rights.79
III. THE MECHAICS AND LAW OF PuBLIc EMPLOYEE BARGAiMNG
A. The State Board is Role in Public Employee Bargaining
The PSLL gives the Board the authority to determine which bargaining
unit is appropriate and whether a particular labor organization has the ma-
74. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.510.
75. See 356 Mo. at 1246, 206 S.W.2d at 542; see also Peters v. Board of
Educ., 506 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Mo. 1974).
76. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520.
77. See 14 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68 (March 15, 1957).
78. 441 S.W.2d at 41. But see Parkway School Dist. v. Provaznik, 617 S.W.2d
489 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (circuit court invaded broad discretion of the board of
education by ordering that the board and teachers association meet and confer in
order to solve a salary dispute). Actually, Missey, 441 S.W.2d 35, probably does not
contradict the Attorney General's Opinion because the Attorney General was most
likely referring to negotiations in the strict sense of collective bargaining, i.e., where
the employer and union are under a duty to listen to and seriously consider each
other's positions. It was not until nine years after this Opinion that the Attorney
General defined the term "negotiations," appearing in the 1965 public employee
bargaining act, as meaning essentially to meet, confer, and discuss. See 23 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 68 (May 6, 1966); see also supra note 37.
79. Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. 1982) (en banc);
Curators of Univ. v. Public Serv. Employees Local No. 45, 520 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo.
1975) (en banc); Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41; Null v. City of Grandview, 669 S.W.2d
78, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). But see Roberts v. City of St. Joseph, 637 S.W.2d 98,
101 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("Since [the Clouse] decision labor relations in the
public sector have been liberalized by [the PSLL].").
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jority support required to become the exclusive bargaining representative in
that unit. 0 An appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees working
for a particular public body who have a clear and identifiable community
of interest.8' A bargaining unit must be an appropriate unity; but it does not
have to be the most appropriate unit. 2
Three of the five Board members constitute a quorum. A quorum is
required to hear a case. 3 In addition the PSLL requires that the Board use
the services of the state hearing officer in all contested cases.8 A board
decision was challenged in one contested case because the Board did not use
the services of the state hearing officer. 5 The court found that Missouri
statutes did not provide for this position. Besides, the court stated, all issues
in such a hearing are to be resolved by the Board, and thus the scope of the
hearing officer's duties would be limited to conducting the hearing and making
recommendations. 6 The court held that the Board properly disregarded the
requirement of using the hearing officer because it would be an absurd result
for the Board to have the duty to resolve issues but be unable to do so
because it must make use of the services of a non-existent hearing examiner.8 7
Before hearing a case the Board must first determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the group of public employees seeking certification of an
appropriate unit and/or an exclusive bargaining representative. As previously
discussed there are a few groups of public employees statutorily excluded
from the PSLL. Although it now appears that police officers, deputy sheriffs,
highway patrolmen, members of the national guard, and teachers have a
constitutional right to form and join labor organizations despite their exclu-
sion from coverage under the PSLL,88 the Board still has no jurisdiction over
the excluded groups since the Board derives its jurisdiction solely from the
PSLL. Such exclusion of police officers from the procedures of the PSLL
80. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.525.
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.500(1) (1978). Among the factors considered by
courts in making a determination on the community of interests of private employees
are the similarity in skills, interests, duties, and working conditions of the employees
and the employer's organizational and supervisory structure. Pacific Southwest Air-
lines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1042-44 (9th Cir. 1978).
82. Comment, Bargaining Units for State and Local Employees, 39 Mo. L.
REv. 187, 200 (1974).
83. City of Kirkwood v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690,
698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
84. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.525. A contested case is "a proceeding before an
agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by
law to be determined after hearing." Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.010(2) (1978).
85. See City of Kirkwood, 478 S.W.2d at 695.
86. Id. at 695-96.
87. Id. at 697.
88. See Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd without
opinion, 426 U.S. 943, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); Bergmann v. Board of
Educ., 360 Mo. 644, 654-55, 230 S.W.2d 714, 720 (Mo. 1950); see also supra notes
69-73 and accompanying text.
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has been upheld as permissible because the unique position occupied by police
officers in society provides a rational basis for the classification. 9 It is prob-
ably safe to assume that this reasoning would also apply to deputy sheriffs,
highway patrolmen, and members of the national guard. Arguably, the rea-
soning here does not apply to teachers who, although they also hold a unique
position in society, are not so closely related to police officers as are the
other excluded groups. However, the exclusion of teachers from the Board's
jurisdiction has never been challenged.
The Board has refused jurisdiction, with court affirmance, over public
safety officers using the police officer exclusion.9 The court justified its
decision on the grounds that the public safety officers performed both police
and firefighting duties, were licensed by the State of Missouri as police
officers, were generally under the command of the patrol lieutenant rather
than the fire lieutenant, were required to carry firearms, and were identified
as "police" or "police patrolmen" on their badges. 91 The Board has, also
with court affirmance, accepted jurisdiction over, and determined an appro-
priate unit including, corrections officers. The Board held that the corrections
officers, whose primary responsibility was the security and custody of inmates
confined in the county jail, were not excluded from the coverage of the PSLL
under the police officer or deputy sheriff exclusions.9 The decision was based
on the grounds that, despite a historic association between jail guards and
deputy sheriffs, corrections officers are neither commissioned nor sworn to
carry firearms, do not wear uniforms or badges, and are not responsible for
enforcing laws. 93 In addition to this case law, the attorney general has issued
an opinion which states that the national guard exclusion does not apply to
the guard's civilian employees. The civilian employees thus may join labor
organizations and enjoy procedural rights under the PSLL.94
Besides the statutory exclusions, the Board and courts have also en-
countered several cases in which it was argued that particular types of em-
ployees should be judicially excluded from the coverage of the PSLL. The
Supreme Court of Missouri has held that employees of the juvenile division
of a circuit court are covered. 95 It was argued that the PSLL did not, on its
face, apply to courts or their functions and that, even if such employees were
covered by the terms of the law, an assertion of jurisdiction by the Board
89. See Vorbeck, 407 F. Supp. at 739.
90. See St. Louis County Police Officers Union Local 844 v. Gregory, 622
S.W.2d 713, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
.91. Id.
92. See Jackson County v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 690 S.W.2d 400,
401 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
93. Id.
94. 25 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 285 (Dec. 10, 1968).
95. State ex rel. O'Leary v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 509 S.W.2d 84,
89 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
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over court employees would constitute an invasion of, and interference with,
the powers of the judicial department, violating the separation of powers
doctrine.9 6 The court answered the first argument by stating that employees
of the juvenile court are covered by the PSLL because the juvenile court
falls within its definition of "public body. ' 97 In response to the second
argument the court held that jurisdiction by the Board over juvenile court
employees is not an invasion of the judiciary by an administrative board
because the Board's decisions are appealable to the courts.93
In another case the curators of the University of Missouri asserted that
the provisions of the PSLL purporting to cover the university's non-academic
employees were unconstitutional given the provision of the Missouri
Constitution99 granting the government of the university to the Board of
Curators. °0 The court held that the PSLL's coverage of the university's non-
academic employees did not encroach upon the curators' power to govern
the university because the PSLL is merely a procedural vehicle for assertion
of public employee's constitutional rights.'0 '
The most difficult issue in the area of judicial exclusions seems to be
whether supervisors are covered by the PSLL. The earliest case dealing with
this issue in Missouri was Golden Valley Memorial Hospital v. Missouri State
Board of Mediation.'02 There the court found that the term "employee" as
used in the PSLL could not mean everyone on the payroll of a public body
because someone had to act for the interests of the public employer. The
court stated that it is the duty of the board to identify those employees who
act directly or indirectly in the interest of their employer in relation to other
employees. The court concluded that such employer-oriented employees should
be excluded from a bargaining unit representing public employees.' 0 Golden
Valley could be interpreted to mean either that supervisors are completely
excluded from coverage under the PSLL or that supervisors are covered but
must be in bargaining units separate from non-supervisory employees. The
96. Id. at 88.
97. Id. at 89.
98. Id.
99. Mo. CONST. art. IX § 9(a).
100. See Curators of Univ. v. Public Serv. Employees Local No. 45, 520 S.W.2d
54, 55 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
101. Id. at 58.
102. 559 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
103. Id. at 583 (The case was remanded to the Board for determination of
whether the duties of head nurses and assistant head nurses involved them in acting
in the interest of the hospital in relation to the other nurses. If so, they were to be
excluded from the bargaining unit.); see also City of Columbia v. Missouri State Bd.
of Mediation, 605 S.W.2d 192, 194-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (Board's inclusion of
fire captains in a unit of firefighters was not arbitrary and capricious); Germann v.
City of Kansas City, 577 S.W.2d 54, 55-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (battalion chiefs in
the fire department lawfully excluded from a unit of fire fighters).
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Board evidently construed the Golden Valley decision to exclude supervisors
from coverage by the PSLL completely and has developed a set of factors
to determine whether a particular employee is a supervisor.104
In City of Cabool v. Missouri State Board of Mediation,IOS the Missouri
Supreme Court for the first time was presented with the question of whether
supervisors are excluded from coverage under the PSLL. The court noted
that the National Labor Relations Act originally contained no exclusion of
supervisors from the definition of "employee," and that the United States
Supreme Court had refused to imply such an exclusion in the face of the
plain and ordinary meaning of the term "employee."' ' 0 The Missouri Su-
preme Court, however, found that the employee involved in City of Cabool
clearly was not a supervisor and refused to settle the question.
0 7
In its most recent case involving the PSLL, Missouri National Educa-
tional Association v. Missouri State Board of Mediation'08 (hereinafter re-
104. City of Cabool v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 689 S.W.2d 51, 54
(Mo. 1985) (en banc). The board's set of factors are:
1. The authority to effectively recommend the hiring, promotion, trans-
fer, discipline or discharge of employees.
2. The authority to direct and assign the work force.
3. The number of employees supervised, and the number of other persons
exercising greater, similar or lesser authority over the same employees.
4. The level of pay, including an evaluation of whether the supervisor
is paid for his skill or for his supervision of employees.
5. Whether the supervisor is primarily supervising an activity or is pri-
marily supervising employees.
6. Whether the supervisor is a working supervisor or whether he spends
a substantial majority of his time supervising employees.
7. The amount of independent judgment and discretion exercised in the
supervision of employees.
Id. at 54 n.2.
105. 689 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
106. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
107. City of Cabool, 689 S.W.2d at 55. Judge Welliver, in his concurrence in
the result, found that the intent of the General Assembly when enacting the PSLL
was to exclude supervisory employees. He stated that such an interpretation of the
PSLL was necessary if public employers are to effectively manage personnel. Id. at
56 (Welliver, J., concurring). The Missouri Supreme Court signalled its acceptance
of the Golden Valley decision in Missouri Nat'l Educ. Assoc. v. Missouri State Bd.
of Mediation (MNEA), 695 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), by citing it
favorably and quoting its discussion on the issue of employer-oriented employees.
MNEA, however, involved confidential employees, not supervisors.
108. 695 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). In this case MNEA sought to have
twelve secretaries included in a bargaining unit of all clerical employees, teacher aides,
and school nurses employed by the Belton School District. The State Board of Me-
diation determined the secretaries were confidential employees and excluded them
from the unit. Id. at 896. Four of the secretaries were assigned to the central ad-
ministrative office and worked closely with the superintendents of the district and
the members of the Board of Education. Their duties included helping the superin-
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ferred to as MNEA), the Missouri Supreme Court approved the Board's
exclusion, from otherwise appropriate bargaining units, of managerial em-
ployees and confidential employees from PSLL coverage.109 Managerial em-
ployees were defined as those employees who formulate, determine, or
effectuate policies on behalf of their employer. 10 Confidential employees
were defined as those employees who, in the normal performance of their
duties, have access to confidential information affecting the employer-em-
ployee relationship."' These two types of employees "are excluded from the
bargaining unit either because their inclusion could create conflicts of inter-
ests in the performance of their duties or because they lack sufficient com-
munity of interest with other workers."" 2 Just as with supervisors, there is
some ambiguity as to whether managerial employees and confidential em-
ployees are completely excluded from the PSLL's coverage or whether they
are excluded only from bargaining units containing other types of employees.
In MNEA, there was also an issue as to whether all confidential employees
must be excluded or just those confidential employees with a "labor nexus."
The latter are those employees acting in a confidential capacity to persons
who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field
of labor relations." 3 The National Labor Relations Board excludes from
coverage under the National Labor Relations Act only those confidential
employees with a labor nexus." 4 The Board, however, rejected the labor-
tendent prepare to negotiate teacher's salaries and processing monthly payments made
by the district. Id. at 899-900. The other eight secretaries were assigned to the indi-
vidual principals and assistant principals. Their duties included the typing of teacher
performance evaluations and statements relating to formal grievances filed by teach-
ers, both of which are prepared by the principals and assistant principals. These
secretaries also had access to the personnel records of the district's teachers. Id. at
900.
109. Id. at 898-99.
110. Id. at 898. College professors are an example of a type of employees
which a court might find to be managerial employees. The United States Supreme
Court has found that the faculty members of a particular private university were
managerial employees because of the large measure of independence they enjoyed.
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
111. MNEA, 695 S.W.2d at 898. An example of a confidential employee is
the personal secretary to a university dean in charge of academic affairs, if the
secretary has access to confidential information affecting the employer-employee re-
lationship, such as the personnel files.
112. Id.
113. Id. An administrative assistant to a high school superintendent would be
a confidential employee with a labor nexus if the superintendent takes an active part
in determining, formulating, and effectuating management policies with respect to
the school's employees. The same administrative assistant would still be a confidential
employee, but not one with a labor nexus, if the superintendent left labor relations
matters solely to the school board.
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nexus test and thus excluded all confidential employees. The Board thought
the labor-nexus test too narrow "to provide a workable basis ... [to] identify
those employees whose interests are more closely allied to the public employer
than to the rank and file employees.""15 The court refused to overturn the
Board's decision."16
In determining whether a particular employee falls within one of the
statutory or judicial exclusions, the courts look primarily at the duties of the
employee, not his job title." 7 Even if a particular employee or group of
employees is excluded from the PSLL's coverage or a particular bargaining
unit, there is still a constitutional right to petition their public employer
directly, without going through a union." 8
Besides determining its jurisdiction, the Board must also determine when
a particular labor organization has majority support in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit so as to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the
unit." 9 However, nothing in the PSLL explains how employees are to select
their bargaining representative nor how the Board is to resolve the issue of
majority status. Given this absence, it appears that the General Assembly
left these matters to the Board's discretion. 20 One case indicates that an
election is the preferred method for determining the bargaining unit's rep-
resentative, but that in some circumstances the use of authorization cards' 2'
is acceptable. 2 2
B. Judicial Review of the Board of Mediation.
Decisions of the Board may be appealed to the circuit court of the county
where the public employer and the public employees are located or to the
circuit court of Cole County. 23 Except in extraordinary circumstances, appeal
may not be taken from a Board bargaining unit determination until the Board
has held an election and certified an exclusive unit representative. The ad-
115. MNEA, 695 S.W.2d at 898.
116. Id. at 899.
117. See Jackson County v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 690 S.W.2d 400,
402 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
118. See State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Mo. 1969).
119. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.525 (1978).
120. City of Kirkwood v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690,
695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
121. Authorization cards are cards signed by members of the unit authorizing
a particular labor organization to be their exclusive bargaining representative. In the
event an election cannot be held, the majority status of the labor organization can
be determined by counting the number of authorization cards which have been signed.
122. See City of Kirkwood, 478 S.W.2d at 695.
123. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.525 (1978).
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ministrative process is not complete until that time.'2 Although there is no
case law, presumably appeal may be taken immediately from a board cert-
ification of an exclusive bargaining representative because the administrative
process would then be complete.
Circuit court review of Board decisions is then appealable to the appellate
courts.'z- The appellate court reviews the findings and decisions of the Board
and not the judgment of the circuit court.12 6
Courts must defer to the Board's findings of fact insofar as they are
supported by competent and substantial evidence 27 and are not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. 128 Courts are not permitted to weigh the evidence
or to substitute their own discretion. 29 The evidence must be considered in
the light most favorable to the Board's decision, 130 drawing from that evi-
dence all reasonable inferences supportive of the decision.'3' The review must
be on the record as a whole. 3 2
The competent and substantial evidence test does not apply when the
Board's determination involves only the application of law to fact. The re-
viewing court may weigh the evidence for itself and determine the facts
accordingly. In such a determination the court shall give due weight to the
opportunity of the Board to observe the witnesses and to the Board's expertise
and experience. 3 3 Questions of law are reserved for the independent judgment
of the reviewing court. 34
124. Lincoln County Memorial Hosp. v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 549
S.W.2d 665, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); see also Golden Valley Memorial Hosp. v.
Missouri State Rd. of Mediation, 559 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
125. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 512.020 (1978).
126. Missouri Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 695 S.W.2d
894, 896 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); City of Cabool v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation,
689 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); City of Columbia v. Missouri State Bd. of
Mediation, 605 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also Mo. REv. STAT. §
536.140.2 (1978).
127. MNEA, 695 S.W.2d at 897; Jackson County v. Missouri State Rd. of
Mediation, 690 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); St. Louis County Police
Officers Union Local 844 v. Gregory, 622 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
City of Columbia v. Missouri State Rd. of Mediation, 605 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980); see also City of Kirkwood v. Missouri State Rd. of Mediation, 478
S.W.2d 690, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.140.2(3)(1978).
128. City of Columbia, 605 S.W.2d at 194; see also Mo. REv. STAT. §
536.140.2(6) (1978).
129. City of Columbia, 605 S.W.2d at 194.
130. Id.; St. Louis County Police Officers Union Local 844 v. Gregory, 622
S.W.2d 713, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
131. City of Columbia, 605 S.W.2d at 194.
132. Gregory, 622 S.W.2d at 714; City of Kirkwood v. Missouri State Rd. of
Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); see also Mo. REv. STAT. §
536.140.2(3) (1978).
133. City of Cabool v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 689 S.W.2d 51, 54
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C. Strikes and Picketing by Public Employees.
"Nothing contained in [the PSLL] shall be construed as granting a right
to [public] employees . . . to strike." '35 Although this provision of the PSLL
does not actually state that public employee strikes are illegal, such strikes
were illegal at common law and the PSLL was interpreted as meaning that
such strikes were illegal.136 A Missouri court has stated that public employee
strikes are illegal because governmental functions may not be impeded or
obstructed and because the profit motive is absent in governmental func-
tions."'
Public employee strikes, as well as work slowdowns and failure to prop-
erly care for publicly owned equipment under one's control, are enjoinable13 1
The injunction must sufficiently specify what acts are enjoined. 3 9 Picketing
by public employees may also be enjoined. 40 Picketing by public employees
is not protected by the Constitution when the result or object contravenes
state law or policy, or when the result disrupts governmental functions or
harms the public health and safety.' 4' Actual or threatened wrongs to a
governmental body constitute sufficient reason to enjoin picketing. 42
(Mo. 1985) (en banc); see also Missouri Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Missouri State Bd. of
Mediation, 695 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Jackson County v. Missouri
State Bd. of Mediation, 690 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Mo. RFv. STAT.
§ 536.140.3 (1978).
134. MNEA, 695 S.W.2d at 897; Jackson County, 690 S.W.2d at 402; City of
Cabool, 689 S.W.2d at 54. A good example of the differences between questions of
law, questions of fact, and applications of law to fact is a case involving an exclusion
of a particular type of employee from the PSLL's coverage. Whether the PSLL does
in fact exclude a particular type of employee is a question of law for the court to
decide. City of Cabool, 689 S.W.2d at 54. The Board's findings as to what are the
duties and responsibilities of the group of employees involved in the particular case
are findings of fact. The court is bound by these findings provided they are supported
by competent and substantial evidence. Jackson County, 690 S.W.2d at 402. A legal
conclusion by the Board that the group of employees involved in the particular case,
given their duties and responsibilities, is excluded from the PSLL's coverage is an
application of the law to the facts. Therefore, the court may weigh the evidence and
determine the facts for itself, although the court must give due weight to the Board's
decision. City of Cabool, 689 S.W.2d at 54.
135. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.530 (1978).
136. See supra note 53.
137. City of Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d at 555, 558 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972) (quoting Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding,
32 II1. 2d 567, 571, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965)).
138. See id. at 556-68; see also State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters
Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
139. See City of Grandview, 481 S.W.2d at 559.
140. City of Webster Groves v. Institutional and Pub. Employees Union, 524
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In addition to being subject to an injunction for a strike, public em-
ployees may also be liable for damages under the recent case of State ex rel.
Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42. 4 1 In Firefighters, the
State of Missouri sued the local to recover for the cost of national guard
replacements who performed firefighting duties during a strike. 14 The union
contended that no remedy for damages against the union existed because the
PSLL provides for no damage remedy and because judicial remedies are
sufficient. 45 The court rejected the union's second argument by pointing out
that the union had struck in the face of an injunction. Since the injunction
had been ignored, judicial remedies had not been sufficient. 46 The court also
rejected the union's first argument by reasoning that despite the PSLL's
silence on remedies, the intent and purpose of the PSLL required the creation
of a new cause of action independent of common law remedies. The remedy
against the union for damages would, stated the court, serve to insure the
integrity of the firefighting function and deter the risk of harm to persons
and property that disruption of service would entail. 47 The court did not say
every public employee strike would create a cause of action for damages. 48
Damages were recoverable in this case because firefighters perform a critical
service, any interruption of which would present a danger to thef public. 49
The court left open the question of whether someone besides the public
employer could have a cause of action for damages against a union for an
illegal strike. 150
In addition to the union, the court in Firefighters indicated that the
individual members could also be liable for the union's acts. 5 ' The court
stated that a union member becomes personally liable for the acts of the
union if the member participates in, authorizes, or ratifies those acts. 52 Thus
each member who votes for or participates in an illegal public employee
143. 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
144. Id. at 103.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 109.
147. Id. at 108-10.
148. Id. at 111.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 110. In Berger v. City of Univ. City, 676 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984), a private citizen had sued the city and the firefighters union for damages
caused by a fire which striking firefighters had refused to fight. The firefighters had
also picketed the fire and threatened firefighters from surrounding municipalities with
physical harm if they attempted to extinguish the blaze. The circuit court had enteredjudgment against the city, the union, and the president of the union. Neither the
union nor the president appealed. Id. at 40. No appellate court has addressed the
question of whether a private citizen can recover from a union damages which are
caused by an illegal strike.
151. See 672 S.W.2d at 123-24.
152. Id. at 124.
1986]
21
Pritchett: Pritchett: Public Employee Labor
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
strike faces potential personal liability for damages resulting from the strike.'53
Only those union members who do not acquiesce in the strike can avoid
personal liability. 54
D. Agreements Between Public Employees and Employers
Under the PSLL, representatives of the public employer are required to
meet, confer, and discuss proposals relative to conditions of employment 5 '
with the exclusive bargaining representative.5 6 Upon completion of these
discussions the results are to be reduced to writing and presented to the
appropriate governing body for adoption, modification, or rejection. 57
The meetings between the representatives of the public employees and
their employers are not required by the Open Meetings Act 58 to be open to
the public. Neither are the public employer's conferences to discuss these
meetings. 59 Courts have recognized but not answered the question of whether
the deliberations of the governing body with respect to adopting, modifying,
or rejecting the results of the discussions between the representatives of the
public employees and their employer must be open to the public.1
60
The PSLL requirement that upon completion of discussions the results
shall be reduced to writing and presented to the appropriate governing body 61
does not require that the representative of the public employer and public
employees actually reach an agreement. Discussions are complete when agree-
ment is no longer possible, i.e., when an impasse has been reached. Thus
the governing body need not wait for an agreement between the public em-
ployers and its employees before it adopts proposals regulating conditions
of employment. 62
Even if an agreement is reached and is adopted by the appropriate
governing body, it still is generally not enforceable. 63 The first case that
153. As a practical matter it would be difficult to prove how particular union
members voted on the strike issue. But it would not be too difficult to prove that
particular union members participated in the strike.
154. Firefighters, 672 S.W.2d at 124.
155. For a discussion of which conditions of employment must be discussed,
see Sullivan, Subjects of Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools: Not Really
Collective Bargaining, 33 Mo. L. REv. 409 (1968).
156. For a discussion on bargaining unit determination, see Comment, Bar-
gaining Units for State and Local Employees, 39 Mo. L. REv. 187 (1974).
157. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520 (1978).
158. Id. §§ 610-610.030.
159. State ex rel. Bd. of Pub. Util. v. Crow, 592 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
160. Id. at 291.
161. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520.
162. Null v. City of Grandview, 669 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
163. See Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc); Null, 669 S.W.2d at 80.
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reached this result was Sumpter v. City of Moberly. 64 There, a firefighters'
union and the city entered into a two-year agreement. The city council enacted
the agreement as an ordinance. Before the agreement's expiration, the city
manager announced unilateral changes in the firefighters' conditions of em-
ployment which conflicted with the provisions of the agreement. The mayor
and city council approved these changes. 16 The firefighters brought suit,
seeking to enforce the original agreement. The firefighters argued that the
provision of the PSLL which allows the appropriate governing body to adopt,
modify, or reject agreements reached under the procedure of the PSLL 66
authorized the governing bodies to enter into binding agreements with public
employees. Therefore, the firefighters contended, the city entered into a bind-
ing and enforceable contract when the city council adopted the original agree-
ment by ordinance. 67
The court held the agreement unenforceable. The provision of the PSLL
at issue says the results of the discussions between public employees and their
employer shall "be presented to the appropriate administrative, legislative or
other governing body ... for adoption, modification or rejection."' 68 Under
Clouse an administrative body cannot enter into a binding contract with
employees because such action would require an impermissible delegation of
legislative power. The court could not conclude that the General Assembly,
by the provisions of the PSLL, intended to authorize and provide for a
binding contract if the governing body is a legislative body, but something
less if it is an administrative board or other governing body. 169 The court
also stressed that the PSLL says nothing about a public body entering into
a contract if it decides to adopt an agreement between a public body and its
employees.170 Finally, the court found that the PSLL did not extend its grants
of authority beyond the constitutional boundaries set forth in Clouse. Since
a binding contract with public employees was beyond the authority of a
public employer under Clouse, such action is also beyond the public em-
ployer's authority under the PSLL.' 71
164. 645 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
165. Id. at 360.
166. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520 (1978).
167. Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 362-63.
168. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520 (1978).
169. Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 363.
170. Id.
171. Id. Another court has stated that governing bodies cannot enter into
binding contracts because the legislative function to alter the agreement by' successive
ordinance remains unimpaired. See Null v. City of Grandview, 669 S.W.2d 78, 80
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984). This conclusion also fits within the reasoning of Clouse, par-
ticularly the Clouse court's sovereignty argument. See supra notes 20-23 and accom-
panying text. Judge Seiler, in a dissent to Sumpter, stated that submitting results of
the discussions to the governing body for its adoption was rendered completely mean-
ingless by the holding that after adoption the agreement thus made could be disre-
garded. Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 365 (Seller, J., dissenting).
1986]
23
Pritchett: Pritchett: Public Employee Labor
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
Agreements adopted by a governing body are sometimes enforceable.
The court in Sumpter stated that the ordinance which enacted the original
agreement, just as any other city ordinance, governed and was binding until
changed by appropriate action. 72 Other cases indicate that the "appropriate
action" referred to in Sumpter is an action of the same character as the one
which approved the original agreement. In other words, since the city in
Sumpter had adopted the original agreement by ordinance, that agreement
remained binding until another ordinance was passed to supplant the adopt-
ing ordinance. 7 1
Some types of agreements do appear to be completely enforceable against
public employers. In Peters v. Board of Education, 174 a teachers' association
entered into a written agreement with the board of education. The agreement
provided for meetings and negotiations between the parties and the necessary
procedures. Recommendations reached in the negotiations were to be sub-
mitted to both parties for ratification and, if approved, were to be entered
in the minutes of the board of education as district policy. The teachers
association sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement was valid.1 71
The court upheld the agreement because the recommendations reached in the
negotiations were advisory only and the board itself still made the final
decision. Since the board was not bound by any arrangements reached in
the negotiations, the agreement did not conflict with the Clouse prohibition
against collective bargaining agreements between public employees and their
employer. 176
An agreement similar to the one in Peters, also between a teachers'
association and a school district, was involved in Finely v. Lindbergh School
District.'" Six years after the agreement took effect, the school board uni-
laterally cancelled it.178 The court ordered the agreement enforced because it
required only that the school board accept additional input during the de-
cision-making process; the ultimate decision was left to the school board. 79
Although the Peters and Finley decisions were not decided under the
PSLL (because teachers were the public employees involved), there is no
logical reason why agreements between public employees covered by the
PSLL and their employers which provide only for discussions and recom-
mendations not binding on the employer should not be equally enforceable.
172. Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 363 n.4.
173. See Murray v. City of Jennings, 639 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
174. 506 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1974).
175. Id. at 430-33.
176. Id. at 433.
177. 522 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
178. Id. at 300.
179. Id. at 302-03. The court also held that 100% membership in the teachers
association was not required before the agreement would be enforced. Other asso-
ciations and individuals could still participate in the negotiations between the school
board and the teachers association. Id. at 303.
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As a final note on the enforceability issue, an agreement produced as the
result of an illegal strike is void and thus unenforceable. 80
E. Unfair Labor Practice Adjudication
The PSLL provides no sanctions for violations of its provisions. Admin-
istration of unfair labor practice complaints under the PSLL has been taken
on by the courts of Missouri. 8' Public employees are entitled to relief against
a governmental body committing unfair labor practices. 8 2' Few Missouri
cases have dealt with unfair labor practices in the public employment area,
but several rules nevertheless have been articulated. Public employers have
the general discretion to layoff and discharge their employees and courts
usually will not interfere with this general discretion.'83 However, the Supreme
Court of Missouri has held that the public employer cannot exercise that
discretion for an illegal purpose that violates statutory rights.' Thus, em-
ployees discharged or demoted because of union activities-employer conduct
forbidden by the PSLL'8 -may be awarded reinstatement and backpay. 8 6
Another court has found that a unilateral salary increase immediately prior
to a representational election was not an unfair labor practice.'87 This court
also found that a meeting of city employees called by the city manager to
advise the employees of a pending representational election, outline the elec-
tion procedure, read statutes covering the right of public employees to or-
ganize, and to discuss a recently adopted plan for salary increases was not
an unfair labor practice.' 88
IV. DIREcTioNs FOR CHANGE FOR MISSOURI
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING LAW
A. The Right to Organize
The Missouri General Assembly enacted the PSLL in 1967.189 With the
exception of one minor amendment in 1969,190 Missouri public employee
180. St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 544 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo.
1976) (en banc).
181. State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d
99, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
182. City of Webster Groves v. Institutional and Pub. Employees Union, 524
S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also State ex. rel. Missey v. City of
Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 43-45 (Mo. 1969).
183. Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 42.
184. Id.
185. Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 105.510 (1978).
186. See Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 44-45.
187. See City of Webster Groves v. Institutional and Pub. Employees Union,
524 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
188. Id. at 164-65.
189. For a general discussion of the provisions of the PSLL, see supra notes
41-53 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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bargaining law has remained stable for almost twenty years. Public employee
relations ideas, however, have not remained stable. As an indication of this
change, many states have adopted completely new public employee bargaining
systems in the last twenty years.' 9' Most of these new public employee bar-
gaining statutes are comprehensive schemes with the rights of public em-
ployees expressly stated, unfair labor practices carefully defined, and
certification of exclusive bargaining representative procedures clearly set out.' 92
Although minute legislative regulation of an area of society is not always
necessary or even desirable, the Missouri General Assembly should at least
study the recent developments in public employee bargaining statutes and
make a deliberate decision to either make some changes or stand pat.
In studying potential changes for Missouri law, the General Assembly
should consider the feasibility of granting public employees in Missouri four
of the most important rights which private employees enjoy under the federal
labor laws. These four rights are the right to organize, the right to bargain
collectively, the right to enforce any agreements reached, and the right to
strike. 93
The right of public employees to organize into unions is not particularly
controversial. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes
applicable to public employees which specifically state that they have the
right to organize.194 Even without these statutes, the right of public employees
191. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-1627 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985) (adopted 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.1-.29 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985) (adopted
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4321 to -4337 (1984) (adopted 1971); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Anderson Supp. 1984) (effective 1984).
192. See, e.g., supra note 191.
193. For the provisions of federal labor law which grant these rights to private
sector employees, see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
194. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.080 (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3415 (West Supp.
1986) (applies to state employees); id. § 3502 (West 1980) (applies to local government
employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-271(a) (West Supp. 1985) (applies to state
employees); id. § 7-468(a) (West 1972) (applies to municipal employees); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 1302 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-618.6(a)(1) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 47.301(1) (West 1981); HAW. REv. STAT. § 89.3 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, para. 1606 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE Ar. § 20.8 (West 1978); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4324 (1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-B (1974) (applies
to state employees); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 2 (1982); MIcH. Comr.
LAWS ANN. § 423.209 (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.06 subd. 2 (Supp.
1985); Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.510 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-201 (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-837 (1984); NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.140 (1985) (applies only to local
government employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:3 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-13A-5.3 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-11.3-03 (Supp. 1985); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.03(A)(1) (An-
derson Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.662 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-11-1 (1979) (applies to state
employees); id. § 28.9.4-3 (applies to municipal employees); S.D. CODImD LAWS
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to organize into unions in all fifty states seems to have been given consti-
tutional protection by Vorbeck v. McNeal'95 where the court struck down
Missouri's denial of the right of police officers to organize as a violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
96
Similar restraints upon the rights of police officers and firefighters have also
been held unconstitutional by other federal courts.' 97 Since no stronger ar-
gument that a particular group of public employees should be denied the
right to organize can be made than in the case of police officers and fire-
fighters, Vorbeck and the other cases indicate that all public employees have
the right to organize.
The PSLL already grants Missouri public employees, except teachers
and those performing police functions, the right to organize. The General
Assembly should amend the PSLL to delete these exceptions. The police
officer exception has been struck down as unconstitutional in Vorbeck and
should be removed in recognition of that decision. It is also probable, as
discussed above, that the other exceptions are also unconstitutional under
Vorbeck and should also be removed. 98
B. The Right to Bargain Collectively
In the private sector, which operates under the National Labor Relations
Act, 99 the employer is required to negotiate with respect to conditions of
employment 2°0 with the union that is the exclusive bargaining representative
of its employees. Any agreement reached is submitted to the union and the
ANN. § 3-18-2 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903(a) (1985) (applies to state em-
ployees); id. tit. 21, § 1721 (1978) (applies to municipal employees); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 41.56.040 (1972) (applies only to local government employees); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (West 1974) (applies to state employees); id. § 111.70(2) (West
Supp. 1985) (applies to local government employees).
195. 407 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo.) (three-judge court), aff'd without opinion,
426 U.S. 943 (1976).
196. Id. at 739.
197. Newport News Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 794 v. City of Newport News,
339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972); Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D.
Ga. 1971); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
198. Missouri courts already recognize the right of teachers to organize. See
supra note 73. As discussed supra at notes 60-63, 88-89, and accompanying text, the
court in Vorbeck held that the exclusion of police officers from the bargaining pro-
cedures of the PSLL was constitutional. Thus, the exclusion of teachers and others
performing police functions is also probably constitutional. The General Assembly,
then, should also either amend the PSLL so that teachers and those performing police
functions are covered by the bargaining procedures of the PSLL or provide for
separate bargaining procedures tailored to the particular circumstances of these groups.
199. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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employer for approval. The employer probably approved the agreement dur-
ing the negotiations, but if it was negotiated by representatives of the em-
ployer who did not have the authority to give final approval, then those with
final authority will have an opportunity to review the agreement and approve
or reject it.
Under the PSLL, a public body20' or its representatives are required to
meet, confer, and discuss proposals relative to conditions of employment
with the union that is the exclusive representative of its employees. 20 2 The
results of such discussions are required to be reduced to writing and then
presented to the appropriate governing body for approval. 203 Up to this point,
the procedures under the PSLL and the National Labor Relations Act for
negotiation of labor agreements seem to be equivalent. But it is here that
the procedures diverge. If the employer in the private sector ultimately rejects
the labor agreement reached by its representatives and the union, then the
negotiations continue until a mutually satisfactory agreement is reached. Under
the PSLL, the governing body may adopt, reject, or modify the agreement
reached between the public body and the union.204 There is no provision for
further negotiation between the public body and the union in the event the
governing body rejects or modifies the agreement. Essentially, the conditions
of employment existing in the private sector are reached through true col-
lective bargaining, i.e., negotiation between the parties and mutual agree-
ment, while under the PSLL the conditions of employment are imposed
unilaterally by the governing body, albeit with input from the union.
Other states have taken a variety of approaches on the issue of how
closely the bargaining process for their public employees should approach
true collective bargaining. Some states, like Missouri, give final approval of
any agreement reached between a public body and a union to the appropriate
governing body, with no provision for further negotiations in the event the
governing body rejects the agreement. 205 One state requires approval by the
governing body, the state legislature in this instance, of any agreement reached
between the state and a union, but in the event the legislature rejects or
modifies the agreement, the state and union are to continue negotiations. 2°6
The scheme is somewhat closer to true collective bargaining in that, even
though the governing body may reject or modify any agreement reached
between a public body and a union, the public body and the union are allowed
201. See supra note 38 for the definitions of, and the distinctions between,
public bodies and governing bodies.
202. Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.520 (1978).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3505.1 (West 1980) (applies to local government
employees only); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 48-837 (1984); S.D. CODnFID LAwS ANN. § 3-
18-7 (1985).
206. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.92 (West Supp. 1986).
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to negotiate further and thus have the opportunity to present their mutual
views to the governing body again and possibly gain acceptance by the gov-
erning body of a subsequent agreement.
Other states require governing body approval of particular items in the
labor agreement. The items in the agreement which do not require governing
body approval become effective upon union and public body approval. Thus,
public sector bargaining closely approaches true collective bargaining with
respect tO the items not requiring governing body approval. 207 The states
using this scheme define the parts of the labor agreement which require
governing body approval in at least three different ways. Some of these states
require governing body approval of any legislative action.20 8 Depending on
the interpretation of items which require legislative action, the scope of items
which do not require governing body approval can be expansive or restrictive.
Other states are more explicit as to which items require governing body
approval. One state requires goxerning body approval of items which conflict
with any statute, ordinance, or other legislative enactment. 2°9 Under this
scheme the scope of items which do not require governing body approval
can be larger or smaller depending on the extent to which the state and its
subdivisions regulate the conditions of public employment. Other states re-
quire governing body approval only of provisions which require the appro-
priation of funds.210 This scheme creates the largest area not subject to
governing body approval, in that a public body and a union can mutually
agree to any provision that does not require appropriation of funds and not
be concerned about whether the governing body will reject their agreement.
Some states have a combination of the last two schemes and require governing
body approval of the items in a labor agreement which require funding and
which conflict with any laws of the state or its subdivisions.2 1 1
207. If the public employees have the right to strike in support of their demands
in regard to the items not requiring governing body approval, then true collective
bargaining has been reached by the public employees. Where public employees have
the right to strike in support of their demands, public sector bargaining cannot be
significantly distinguished from private sector bargaining.
208. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330(c) (1984); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 201.12
(McKinney 1983); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(B) (Anderson Supp. 1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.901 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
209. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1725(c) (1978).
210. See ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.215 (1984); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3517.7 (West
Supp. 1986) (applies to state government employees only); HAw. REv. STAT. § 89-
10(b) (1976); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D.1.E(3) (Supp. 1986) (applies to
state government employees only); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 7(b), (c) (1982
& Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-102 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-
A:3.II(b) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 982(c) (1985) (applies to state employees
only).
211. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-278(b) (West Supp. 1986) (applies to
state government employees); id. § 7-474(b) (West 1972) (applies to municipal gov-
ernment employees); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309(2), (3) (West 1981); IOVA CODE
ANN. § 20.17.6 (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.22 subd. 4 (Supp. 1985).
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Most of the states which require governing body approval of particular
items also provide for further negotiation between the public body and the
union in the event the governing body does not approve any of the items
requiring approval. As discussed above, a provision for further negotiations
provides the public body and the union with a second chance to present their
mutual views to the governing body with the possibility that the governing
body will accept the subsequent agreement.
The public employee bargaining statutes in some states provide for bar-
gaining between the public body and the union without any apparent re-
quirement for governing body approval of any provision of the agreement
reached. 212 Under such a scheme, public sector bargaining would approach
true collective bargaining. Given the general constitutional requirement that
appropriation of funds requires legislative approval, it is doubtful that any
legislature would be forced to appropriate funds to give effect to any labor
agreement which it had not adopted. 213
The right of public employees to strike should also be considered under
the general topic of collective bargaining. 2 4 Some states allow public em-
ployees a limited right to strike. In these states, public employee bargaining
most closely approaches true collective bargaining. Regardless of which form
of governing body approval the state has chosen, if the public employees are
unhappy with the governing body's actions or with the public body's actions
with respect to a labor agreement, the public employees may be able to strike
to pressure the governing body or public body to modify its position. Thus,
the mechanics of public employee bargaining would be quite similar to the
mechanics of bargaining in the private sector.
Given the number of states which have enacted statutes which provide
for true public sector collective bargaining, the Missouri General Assembly
should also consider providing a scheme of bargaining for Missouri public
employees that more closely approaches true collective bargaining. The reason
the General Assembly should want to grant greater bargaining rights to public
employees is stated in the declaration of policy of Alaska's public employee
bargaining statute:
212. These states include Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin (with respect to local government em-
ployees only).
213. See State v. AFSCME, Local 1726, 298 A.Zd 362 (Del. Ch. 1972) (state
and its agencies cannot be bound to expenditures of funds which have not been
appropriated). But see Foster-Gloucester Regional School Committee, Rhode Island
State Labor Relations Board, Case No. ULP-1012 (1971), discussed in 1 Pub. Em-
ployee Bargaining (CCH) para. 2510 (1980) (school committee compelled to sign
agreements previously reached even though the financial town meeting reduced the
appropriations).
214. For a more expansive discussion of the right of public employees to strike,
see infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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The legislature finds that joint decision-making is the modem way of ad-
ministering government. If public employees have been granted the right to
share in the decision-making process affecting wages and working conditions,
they have become more responsive and better able to exchange ideas and
information on operations with their administrators. Accordingly, govern-
ment is made more effective. 215
Also, any abridgement of bargaining rights of public employees can result
in a breakdown in communications between public employers and employees
and result in misunderstandings, resentment, strife, and unrest. 21 6
Even if the General Assembly should decide that public employees should
have greater bargaining rights, however, it may not be able to provide for
such rights on its own. The problem is the Clouse decision. In Clouse, as
discussed above, the Missouri Supreme Court held that public employees
could not, under the Missouri Constitution, bargain collectively with their
employer. 217 The interpretation of Clouse given in State ex rel. Missey v. City
of CabooP18 indicates that any increase in the bargaining rights of public
employees beyond the rights granted in the PSLL would be unconstitutional.
The court stated that the PSLL does not violate Clouse because the legislative
discretion of the governing body is preserved in that the governing body can
adopt, modify, or reject outright the agreement reached between the public
body and the union.219 Thus, removing any items of a labor agreement from
the requirement of governing body approval, even those which conflict with
no laws and which require no funding, would seem to violate the Missouri
Constitution as interpreted in Clouse and Missey. The most the General
Assembly could do on its own would be to provide for further negotiations
between the public body and the union in the event the governing body
rejects or modifies a labor agreement. Due to Clouse and Missey, any sub-
stantial increase in the bargaining rights of Missouri's public employees will
probably require a constitutional amendment.
C. The Right to Enforce Any Agreement Reached
The public employee bargaining statutes of some states specifically pro-
vide that labor agreements properly adopted under the provisions of the
statute are "binding" or "enforceable" on the parties.2 0 Other public em-
215. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070 (1984).
216. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4321 (2) (1984).
217. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1245, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542
(Mo. 1947) (en banc).
218. 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
219. Id. at 41.
220. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210 (1984); HAw. REv. STAT. § 89-10(a) (1976);
IOwA CODE ANN. § 20.17.5 (West 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-306(2) (1985);
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ployee bargaining statutes implicitly indicate that properly adopted agree-
ments are to be binding and enforceable by calling such agreements "contracts"
or stating that such agreements are "effective" or "valid" upon adoption. 22'
Still other statutes make the breach of properly adopted agreements an unfair
labor practice.22 Finally, in some states properly adopted labor agreements
are made binding and enforceable on the parties by court decision. 223
In Missouri, under Sumpter v. City of Moberly,224 properly adopted
public employee labor agreements are binding and enforceable only so long
as the governing body does not reverse an earlier acceptance of the labor
agreement by legislative action of the same character as that action by which
the governing body adopted the labor agreement.? Under Sumpter, the
governing body can prevent enforcement of a labor agreement which it
adopted, by enacting new legislation repudiating or modifying the earlier
adoption.
The Missouri General Assembly should take all action within its power
to reverse the Sumpter decision and make properly adopted public sector
labor agreements specifically enforceable. Many other states provide for en-
forcement of labor agreements, and allowing the governing body to prevent
enforcement of a labor agreement against itself by unilateral action introduces
an assymmetry into public employee bargaining. Simply put, it is not fair to
allow the governing or public body to enforce labor agreements against the
union, while allowing the governing body to take action which can prevent
the union from enforcing the agreement against the governing body and the
public body.
221. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-278(d) (West Supp. 1986) ("effective")
(applies to state government employees); KAN. STAT. Am. § 75-4330(c) (1984) ("ef-
fective"); MmN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.20 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1987) ("contract");
PA. STAi. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.901 (Purdon Supp. 1986) ("effective"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-9.4-5 (1986) ("contract") (applies to municipal government employees);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 3-18-8 (1985) ("effective"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1725(a) (1978) ("contract") (applies to municipal government employees only).
222. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 89-13(a)(8), (b)(5) (1976) (the Hawaii public bar-
gaining statute also has a separate section stating that properly adopted labor agree-
ments are enforceable); N.H. REv. STAT. ,ANN. § 273-A:51(h), (i), 11(f) (1977); OR.
REv. STAT. § 243.672(1)(g), (2)(d) (1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.84(1)(e), (2)(d) (West
1974) (applies to state government employees); id. § 111.70(3)(a)(5), (b)(4) (West
1974) (applies to local government employees).
223. See Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328,
540 P.2d 609, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976);
State v. AFSCME, Local 1726, 298 A.2d 362 (Del. Ch. 1972) (labor agreements
binding except insofar as in conflict with provisions of law or constitution); Teamsters
Local 331 v. City of Atlantic City, 191 N.J. Super. 404, 467 A.2d 264 (Ch. Div.
1981), aff'd, 191 N.J. Super. 394, 467 A.2d 259 (Ct. App. Div. 1983).
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However, the General Assembly may not be able to take this action
alone. Sumpter was based in large part upon the Clouse decision. The court
stated that enforceable public sector labor agreements were beyond the con-
stitutional boundaries of Clouse. Therefore, since the PSLL had been inter-
preted in State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool76 and Curators of University
of Missouri v. Public Service Employees Local No. 4527 as not granting
public employees rights which extended beyond Clouse's constitutional
boundaries, public sector labor agreements were not enforceable under the
PSLL.228
The Missouri Supreme Court did state in Sumpter, quoting from the
Curators decision, that it would at least consider an attack on the limits of
the Clouse decision if the General Assembly amended the PSLL to extend
its requirements beyond the boundaries set in Clouse.229 Thus there is hope
that if the General Assembly does make public sector labor agreements en-
forceable, the Missouri Supreme Court will overrule Clouse, at least in part,
and uphold the legislation.
If, however, a constitutional amendment is required to make public
sector labor agreements enforceable, that course should be taken. There is
no excuse for allowing one party to a contract to avoid its obligations while
the other party can be held to its obligations under compulsion of law. This
is true even where the party seeking to avoid its obligations is a governmental
entity. Governmental entities frequently enter into construction and delivery
contracts. These contracts are binding against the governmental entity.20
Public sector labor agreements are not intrinsically different from such con-
tracts and therefore should also be enforceable.
D. The Right to Strike
Few would argue that public employees should have an absolute right
to strike. Given the nature of public services, the public health, safety, and
welfare could be endangered by public employee strikes under certain cir-
cumstances. Acceptance of this view, however, does not automatically lead
to the conclusion that no public employees should be allowed to strike. A
strike by the clerks in the Department of Revenue would cause inconvenience,
but so does a strike by the clerks of the local grocery store. A strike by
garbage collectors causes some discomfort but would not endanger the public
safety nearly as much as a strike by firefighters.
226. 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
227. 520 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1975) (en bane).
228. Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 363.
229. Id. (quoting Curators, 520 S.W.2d at 58).
230. See Comment, supra note 20, at 986.
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In recognition of the similarities between some public employees and
private employees and the differences between different groups of public
employees, twelve states provide for a limited right to strike by some public
employees. One state has done this by court decision,23' nine have done so
by statute, 232 and two have done so by court interpretation of statute.23 The
statutes establishing a limited right to strike differ in detail among the states,
but the general philosophy of all the statutes is that public employee strikes
are allowed unless there is an imminent danger to the public health, safety,
and welfare.
In Missouri, public employee strikes are illegal, both at common law
and by statute. The Missouri General Assembly should consider the similar-
ities between some public employees and private employees and the differ-
ences among groups of public employees and enact a limited right to strike
for Missouri's public employees. Such an enactment would recognize that
there are situations in which a strike by public employees is no more dis-
ruptive or dangerous to the public than are private sector strikes. In such
situations there is no rational basis for denying public employees the right
to strike.
V. CONCLUSION
The law of public employee bargaining in Missouri has changed little
since the Clouse decision in 1947. Missouri has since passed a statute dealing
with the subject, but it has been interpreted as providing public employees
with no additional substantive rights beyond those they already constitution-
231. See County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Ass'n, Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985) (en banc).
232. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984); HAW. Ruv. STAT. § 89-12 (1976
& Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1617-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18 (West Supp. 1985); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)
(Anderson Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§
1101-1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978) (applies
to municipal government employees only); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111 .70(4)(cm)(5), (6c),
(7m) (West Supp. 1985) (applies to local government employees only).
233. In State Dep't of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont.
349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974), the Montana Supreme Count held that MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 59-1603(1) (1947) (which is now MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1985)), which gives
public employees the right to engage in concerted activities, also gives public em-
ployees the right to strike since a strike is a concerted activity. In Local 1494 v. City
of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978), the Idaho Supreme Court
interpreted IDAHO CODE § 44-1811 (1977), which states that firefighters cannot strike
during the term of a contract, to mean that firefighters could strike after the contract
expires. However, the court also held that striking gives cause for discharge, unless
there are contract provisions to the contrary. This limited right to strike by firefighters
does not extend to other public employees. School Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v.
Oneida Educ. Ass'n, 98 Idaho 486, 567 P.2d 830 (1977).
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ally enjoyed under Clouse.2 14 The PSLL does, however, provide a procedure
under which most public employees can exercise their rights. 5 Also, almost
twenty years of case law has fleshed out the bounds and implications of the
rights declared under Clouse. It is time, however, to reevaluate public em-
ployee labor law. The justifications for the restrictions placed on public
employees in Clouse need to be reexamined to determine whether they retain
any validity in current circumstances. The perceived differences between pub-
lic and private employment need to be reexamined too, with a view toward
minimizing differences in treatment. In short, much has occurred since the
PSLL was enacted and even more has occurred since the Clouse decision; it
may be time for a change.
MICHAEL PRITCHETT
234. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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